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Abstract
We explain the Sulphur Emission Control Area (SECA) compliance through
analyzing both rational and moral factors for compliance motivation. According
to preliminary analysis based on samples and measurements, the compliance
rate for SECA is rather good and air quality has improved significantly. As
costs of compliance are rather high and penalties for non-compliance rather low
for regulation targets, moral motivation factors must be relevant for compliance.
Maintaining good relationships with control authorities and peers requires
shipowners to comply with the rules for practical and moral legitimacy. Our
interviews with Danish, Finnish and Estonian shipowners confirmed that most
of them follow the law simply because it is the law, this applying both to
current Baltic Sea SECA rules and the future global sulphur emission rules.
Obeying environmental law thus has a taken-for-granted status among shipping
companies. Almost half of the companies specifically mentioned they follow
the SECA rules because they want to take care of the environment, thus having
internalized the regulatory content. Some companies see global compliance to
depend on efficient controls.
Keywords Environmental regulation . Compliance .Motivation . Legitimacy . Sulphur .
Baltic Sea
1 Introduction
To measure the impact of an environmental regulation, it is necessary to know whether
and how well it is complied with. Compliance rate usually refers to the percentage of
regulation targets behaving in compliance with the rules at a specific time in a specific
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place. The behaviour of the largest polluters is more important for the societal outcome
than the behaviour of the smaller ones. If control authorities understand the capabilities
and motivations of regulation targets along with the external pressures they confront, it
allows them to employ more efficient enforcement strategies (Gunningham 2011).
The goal of the Baltic Sea SECA (Sulphur Emission Control Area) rules is to reduce
sulphur emissions from ships operating in theBaltic Sea. The SECA ruleswere negotiated in
the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO 2008), which is a part of United Nations. The rules are in theMARPOL
Annex VI. There are SECAs also in North America and the Caribbean, and they fall under
their respective MoUs. Since 2015, the sulphur limit of 0.1% for marine fuel in the SECAs
applies. In sea areas outside the SECAs, the limit is 3.5%. In the European Union, the
international sulphur rules have been implemented by the Directive (EU) 2016/802
(European Parliament and Council 2016). For passenger ships that regularly operate to or
from any EU port, the limit for fuel sulphur content outside the SECAs is 1.5%.
Either ship fuel must contain maximum 0.1% sulphur or exhaust gases must be cleaned.
SECA entered into force in 2015, and we discuss its compliance in different parts of the
Baltic Sea 3 years later. We aim at understanding the rational calculation and moral
motivation factors that explain Baltic Sea SECA compliance and that will determine the
compliance for the global 2020 sulphur emission rules (max 0.5% sulphur in ship fuel). We
want to know whether the shipping companies operating in the Baltic Sea region see non-
compliance with the sulphur rules as unthinkable, and we also aim to analyze why.
The findings will be relevant also for understanding the compliance motivations of
other environmental regulation with a long and varying history (Peterson and Diss-
Torrance 2012).
2 Explanations for regulatory compliance
The reasons for why companies comply with law in general and environmental law in
particular are studied at least in law and economics, legal sociology, criminology,
legislative studies, and management.
Effective regulation depends on the ability and motivation of the regulation targets to
comply. Ability requires awareness of the rules and capacity to obey them
(Nollkaemper 1993, 238.) Regulation on marine pollution is and should not be based
on what currently is technologically and economically feasible. Regulation must still
assume that cleaner options at least have potential to become widely available within a
reasonable time. As a result of new regulation, a part of regulation targets, also in the
case of SECA, may end up in a position where compliance is not a viable option.
Regulation must assume that such companies will exit the business instead of non-
compliance (Nollkaemper 1993, 238).
From the classical law and economics perspective, compliance is based on
rational calculation, where the costs of compliance are weighed against the
likelihood of detection multiplied with the severity of punishment (Becker
1968). If the anticipated punishment of non-compliance exceeds the costs of
compliance, rational regulation targets will comply (Cooter and Ulen 2013). The
calculation is based on how regulation targets perceive the probability of sanctions.
Evidence shows that punishment calculations do have a role in real life: a fine for a water
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pollution violation for one actor changed the behaviour of all actors resulting in a two
thirds reduction in the statewide violation rate in the year following the fine (Shimshack
and Ward 2005). The rational calculation perspective is inadequate in fully explaining
compliance as it ignores human moral emotions and willingness to comply with the
rules of society. Compliance to environmental regulations is typically higher than
predicted by standard economic theory. This has been labelled as the “Harrington
paradox” (Harrington 1988; Nyborg and Telle 2007). The paradox can be summarized
in the following three statements (Harrington 1988):
(i) For most sources of pollution, the frequency of surveillance is quite low.
(ii) Even when violations are discovered, fines or other penalties are rarely used in
most states.
(iii) Sources are, nonetheless, thought to be in compliance a large part of the time.
Humans decide to follow certain rules but not others. Kagan et al. (2011, 37) list
three main motivational factors as explaining why businesses are motivated to
comply with laws: the fear of punishment, concern over reputation and a sense of
duty. Similarly, Nielsen and Parker (2012) identify three main strands of compli-
ance motivations: (1) economic, (2) social and (3) normative. Winter and May
(2001) list calculated motivations, social motivations and normative motivations.
May (2004) separates between negative and affirmative motivations for
compliance, where negative emotions arise from fear of punishment, affirmative
motivations from good intention and a sense of obligation. Tyler (2011, 79) says
compliance is based on either external or external motivations, where the
command-and-control model is based on the former and the self-regulatory model
on the latter. This resonates with the findings of Van Vugt and Tybur (2015) on
how human hierarchies are based either on dominance or prestige. For Nielsen and
Parker (2012, 431), social motivations refer to earning the approval and respect of
others and normative motivations to doing the right thing. With social motivation,
the values need not be (yet) internalized and compliance behaviour is rather based
on social pressure from other regulated firms, trade associations, advocacy groups,
the media, family and friends and inspectors (Winter and May 2001, 678).
Normative motivation is a combined sense of moral duty and agreement with
the importance of a given regulation (Winter and May 2001, 677.) The sense of
right and wrong has been internalized: an offence is unthinkable, off the deliber-
ative agenda. The sense of right and wrong is constituted by shaming and social
disapproval vs. pride and praise in relationships based on trust and respect
(Nielsen and Parker 2012, 434.)
Summarizing the compliance motivation literature, the differences between rational/
economic/calculated motivations, social/reputational motivations and morality/
conscience seem clear. We believe it is the most realistic to acknowledge that humans
have plural motives all at once, and that they may be inconsistent (see Nielsen and
Parker 2012, 429). An actor does not merely apply its economic/material thinking, its
social/reputational concerns or its sense of duty, but instead all of them. The actions of
regulators and other stakeholders can influence which motive comes to the fore at any
particular time (Nielsen and Parker 2012, 434). Trust in the impartiality of the author-
ities issuing the regulation (Black 2008) and the appropriateness of the regulation both
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increase compliance (Börzel et al. 2012). Makkai and Braithwaite (1991) found that if
company management perceives to have some control over the law enforcement
process, it increases organizational compliance. If the authority listens to the regulation
targets, its ruling feels more legitimate to them. The authorities need to recognize
possible business subcultures that resist regulation: participation in such subcultures
may negatively impact compliance (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 94).
We believe the legitimacy theory brings together the motivational theories and the
social environment. An organization needs to gain and maintain legitimacy within a
societal system, and therefore is motivated to comply with its prevailing norms.
Suchman (1995, 574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. Suchman (1995) distin-
guishes three types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and cognitive. Often they co-exist
and reinforce one another. Pragmatic legitimacy means that an organization meets
stakeholder expectations or audience interests. Moral legitimacy is achieved, if societal
evaluators such as environmental public interest groups or the general public refer to
actions of the organization as the right thing to do. Cognitive legitimacy is created
when the organization has a taken-for-granted status in society: society accepts it
necessary or inevitable. According to Mobus (2005), gaining legitimacy requires
substantial effort but maintaining legitimacy is a low-effort process. Repairing lost
legitimacy again requires substantial effort.
Protecting the (marine) environment is a complex ecological and social
question. Pieraccini et al. (2017) reviewed the literature on marine protected areas
and found that planning, governance, enforcement, socio-economic incentives,
community involvement and conflicts between stakeholder groups create the
social framework that explains (non-)compliance. According to Agardy et al.
(2011), non-compliance with marine protected areas commonly occurs when
people do not understand (or have not been told) the reasons for restrictions.
Many people very willingly abide by the rules when they recognize it is in their
own self-interest to do so. One of the great shortcomings of government agencies
and NGOs alike has been failing to communicate how marine protected areas can
meet multiple objectives and steer things towards sustainability. Enforcement may
be more readily accepted, especially in cases like open access waters where the
“anything goes” rules precede management, when people understand why regula-
tions are needed and for whose benefit.
Raakjaer Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) studied regulatory compliance in Danish
fisheries and found that both economic/rational and socio/moral motivational factors
had a major impact. Rational factors include the economic gains to be obtained and the
threat of sanctions. Compatibility between regulations and fishing practices and the
norms and morals of the individual fishers were important for compliance. There were
indications that if fishers participated the regulatory process, it stimulated rule compli-
ance (Raakjaer Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003).
In shipping, compliance of regulations has previously been found to vary geograph-
ically and by shipping segments. Vessels operating in European and North American
waters are more compliant in global comparison, mainly due to strong enforcement of
port state control. As regards segments, tankers and container vessels follow regulations
better than, e.g. bulk ships, because there are segment-specific norms and codes of
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conduct in place in tankers and in container transport. In shipping, the compliance rate
is generally higher with environmental regulations compared to health and safety
regulations (Bloor et al. 2013).
3 SECA compliance and what explains it
3.1 Data on SECA compliance
According to OECD 2016, the reported compliance rate in the European ECAs after
2015 was above 95%. This figure is based on data from port state controls, monitoring
of smokestacks of ships and air quality monitoring in or outside port cities (OECD
2016). As the OECD (2016) states, this data either illustrates high compliance or the
difficulty to detect non-compliance. The records of the THETIS-EU system show the
results of fuel samples taken by the control authorities of the EUMember States (Thetis
derives from the Greek goddess of the sea). THETIS-EU is the platform to record and
exchange information on the results of SECA compliance verifications performed by
the EU Member States. During the first 22 months (January 2015 to end of October
2016), the percentage of non-compliant samples was 3.53% in the Baltic Sea, 5.41 in
the North Sea and 3.38% outside the SECAs (Alda 2016). The most common breach so
far found in the EU sulphur inspections is the inadequacy of logs: the ships cannot
show transparent information on how the fuel switch happens when crossing SECA
borders (Trafikanalys 2017, 27).
Airborne measurements tell the same story: the emissions have been reduced
significantly. The Belgian Sniffer Campaign implemented at the North Sea in 2016
showed a 8% non-compliance (Van Roy and Scheldeman 2016). According to
preliminary results from Mellqvist (Mellqvist et al. 2017a, b, c), the SECA compli-
ance rate is above 90% in Danish waters and close to Gothenburg; however, the
individual companies breaking the rules are always the same. Vessels that only rarely
come into the Baltic Sea waters break the rules more frequently. Compliance is higher
at Great Belt Bridge than in Baltic proper. The Great Belt Bridge is known to be
monitored, whereas the Baltic proper is probably seen as less monitored. It seems the
fear of getting caught does have a role in compliance. In addition to the variable risk
of getting caught, also the sanctions of getting caught vary according to port state and
may not be a strong enough deterrent in all cases. It is more common that vessels emit
excessive sulphur as they are leaving the SECA rather than on the way in, because on
the way in, they risk an on-board inspection. Some ships that have installed scrubbers
have still been observed to have high levels of emissions on multiple occasions.
(Mellqvist et al. 2017a, b, c). The trend seems to be towards stronger compliance
(Mellqvist et al. 2017a).
Overall air quality has also improved significantly. Close to port cities, there are
also other sources of SOx such as the industry and cars; therefore, ship regulation
alone cannot reduce the sulphur concentrations to zero. However, the shipping
regulations have significantly impacted the situation: in three different locations in
Denmark, SO2 concentration in the air was 47 to 60% lower in 2015 than in the
previous years (Ellerman 2015), and in Hamburg, SO2 concentrations have reduced
by 50% (Kattner et al. 2015).
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3.2 Explaining SECA compliance as rational calculation
The SECA regulation targets are the shipowners. The main compliance options are fuel
change and the use of an exhaust gas scrubber (Kalli et al. 2014; Lähteenmäki-Uutela
et al. 2017). Both come with a cost (Nikopolou 2017). These costs can be substantial
and influence the competition of trade markets (Gritsenko and Yliskylä-Peuralahti
2013; Bergqvist et al. 2015).
The share of fuel cost in total vessel operating costs is high, about 25 to 45%
for roro vessels in Notteboom’s (2011) example. The EMSA (2010) estimated the
costs of fuel switch to be 0.1–0.2 € per ton traded by sea in the SECA area or that
complying with the rules raises the transport costs by 10–20% (EMSA 2010).
According to Jiang et al. (2014), marine gas oil (MGO) was a more cost-effective
compliance option than a scrubber when the price difference between heavy fuel
oil (HFO) and MGO was less than 231 euros per tonne. The investment payback
time for a scrubber depends on the price difference between dirtier and cleaner
fuel. The prices of marine fuel oils, in turn, are based on oil price along and the
demand/supply balance (Notteboom 2011, 66). Altogether for all the European
SECAs (the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the English Channel), Kalli et al.
(2013) predicted the costs of fuel switch to be between 3.3 and 4.6 billion USD
per year. Out of all the ships sailing the Baltic Sea in 2015, Antturi et al. (2016)
estimated that 4719 ships had switched to low-sulphur fuel (MGO), and 136 ships
had installed a scrubber. The yearly costs of added fuel price and scrubbers for
these ships were estimated to be altogether 465 million euros in 2015 prices. This
would make the average added yearly cost for one ship sailing the Baltic Sea
around 100,000 euros in 2015. For one big ship, an added cost of 100,000 euros
may occur for one round trip between the UK and Sankt Petersburg.
All the rational compliance calculations depend heavily on the marine fuel prices,
and the prices have varied considerably both before and after 2015. In September 2014,
the price of 0.1% MGO BW was at its highest at $22.49/mmBTU. At this time,
intermediate fuel oil (IFO 380) cost $15.5/mmBTU. After this, the prices of all fuels
went down. At its lowest in February 2016, MGO cost $8.03/mmBTU and IFO cost
$4.43/mmBTU. The lowering fuel prices softened the impact of the SECA for ship-
owners and their customers and may have impacted compliance motivation also. Still,
MGO has constantly been around at least 50% more expensive than IFO with the price
curves of these fuels having a steady distance. After 2016, the prices have been on the
rise. In October 2018, the price for MGO was again high at $18.53/mmBTU and the
price of IFO was $13.02/mmBTU (Det Norske Veritas at https://www.dnvgl.
com/maritime/lng/current-price-development-oil-and-gas.html).
The rise in MGO price presumably makes companies shift to other fuels or
scrubbers and/or lowers their compliance motivation. Trafikanalys (2017) for example
presumes that rising fuel prices will make non-compliance attractive. As alternatives to
MGO and scrubbers, also “hybrid fuels” (or emission control area fuels, ECA fuels, or
ultra-low sulphur fuel oils, ULSFO) have been introduced to the market. Hybrid fuels
are a trade name for fuels that suit large marine diesel engines and fulfill the sulphur
requirements. They are more similar to residual fuels than to distillates (MGO or MDO)
as regards viscosity and lubricity. A part of ships also uses LNG (liquefied natural gas)
or methanol as fuel. The total amount of marine fuel used in the Baltic Sea is quite
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difficult to assess, as bunkering occurs in many different ports and at sea, within and
outside the SECA (Trafikanalys 2016, 16).
The amount of fines, particularly in relation to the compliance costs, is the other
critical element in any rational calculations about the cost-efficiency of compliance vs.
non-compliance. A penalty that barely matches the gains from violation is not a true
deterrent (Fung 2016). Compliance monitoring is performed by the IMO member states
based on national legislation and varies between the IMO member states. The control
authorities are the flag states and the port states. The Baltic Sea and North Sea control
authorities are members of the Paris memorandum of understanding on port state
control, where the mission is to eliminate the operation of sub-standard ships through
a harmonized system of port State control (ParisMoU 2018). The European Directive
has no provisions for a mandatory system for reporting inspections and sharing the
inspection results, but the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), an information
system that Member States use on a voluntary basis since 2015. The THETIS-EU
system aims to support the port state control inspection regime and facilitate the
assessment of compliance. It has operated since 2015. The goal is to enable risk-
based inspection targeting based on alerts from remote sensing and fuel calculator
inspection tools (EMSA 2018).
Each country independently decides on the administrative and criminal sanctions.
The criminal sanctions include fines to the shipping company and/or its crew and even
imprisonment of crew. A typical administrative sanction is vessel detention. According
to Fung (2016), the maximum financial penalties in the Baltic Sea region for the
violation of the SECA regulations range from 2900 euros in Latvia to about a million
euros in Sweden, Finland and Poland, where Denmark has no specific maximum
penalty. Nordic countries use criminal penalties, whereas administrative penalties are
used in Baltic countries, Germany and Poland. We cannot conclude that low penalties
would make total non-compliance the rational option. The amount of fines multiplied
with the probability of getting caught is no doubt significant in parts of the Baltic Sea.
Outside the Baltic Sea, Norway targets to have fines that are higher than the difference
in fuel cost. Probably the rational option for many shipowners would be to use legal
fuel or scrubber where fines are large and compliance monitoring is strong and to use
illegal fuel or switch off the scrubber in other places.
A cheating strategy with the fuel switch will produce some psychological stress.
Future systems where fuel use is monitored real time will reduce the incentives for
illegal fuel switch.
The severity and probability of sanctions are the other main issues in any rational
calculations on whether to comply. As regards monitoring and sanctions, a main issue
is the international nature of both the shipping business and of the regulatory institu-
tions. Outside territorial waters in the open sea, there is no normative authority to
monitor compliance. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) employs the so-called Freedom of the seas concept. Innocent passage
should always be allowed (United Nations 2018). This concept may be partly the
reason why shipping is lacking behind in environmental regulation compared for
instance to industrial operations and other modes of transport. Lately, however, the
international community and the IMO have been active in developing environmental
regulation for shipping, challenging the freedom of the seas concept as an idea of
shipping freely utilizing the sea. Maritime spatial planning (MSP) and blue growth
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strategies focus on taking into account the environmental boundaries and balancing the
interests of all blue business sectors.
OECD (2016) identifies a legal gap, a detection gap and a sanction gap that are
relevant for the compliance of SOx emission regulations. The legal gap is related to
shipping regulation being implemented by flag states and port states. Shipowners can
register their ships wherever they want (choose a flag state), and registries vary in how
they enforce the sulphur emission rules. Registers are chosen based on “favourable
conditions, such as limited costs and flexibility with regards to regulations and their
implementation”. The second control mechanism is the port state control: in territorial
waters of a state, the state can control that international shipping regulations are
complied with, irrespective of the flag of the ship. Port state control is limited to what
they can detect: a ship may have a scrubber and/or carry low-sulphur fuel, but the port
state does not know whether they have been used. And even if a port authority would
detect that a ship has been non-compliant throughout its entire voyage, it can only
apply sanctions for what has happened in its territorial waters. Port states can and do
coordinate their enforcement efforts (OECD 2016, 40). The 2020 global sulphur
emission cap will pose even bigger legal problems than the current SECA areas, as a
large part of seas and oceans belong to no state. The OECD (2016, 41) suspects the
likelihood of compliance outside territorial waters will be reduced. Greater enforce-
ability could be achieved by reversing who carries the burden of proof so that a
shipping company would need to show that it has obeyed the rules.
Another gap is the detection gap. Even if an authority has legal competence to
control the emissions, it may not detect non-compliance. Port states take oil samples
and verify bunker delivery notes. It is difficult to determine whether a fuel switch has
been done when entering the SECA, and bunker delivery notes are “notoriously subject
to irregularities and fraud” (OECD 2016, 41). The use of a mass flowmeter allows the
inspectors to know the exact amount of fuel that has been bunkered. These flowmeters
are mandatory in Singapore since 2017. In the future, the carriage of heavy fuel oil for
propulsion purposes may be prohibited altogether (Ibid., 42).
The SECA compliance monitoring is now largely based on port states taking fuel
samples, but ship emissions can also be monitored airborne, possibly also from
satellites (CompMon 2018) if decided so in the IMO. Air pollution monitoring is
performed via planes, drones, and sniffers. It is not possible to fly over all shipping
routes in the world, and some flag states may not want to fear shipowners with sniffers.
The OECD report lists big data solutions, on-board monitoring equipment and satellites
as future monitoring measures (OECD 2016, 41). It may be possible to add sniffers in
all ships and have them send the results of compliance as part of Automatic Identifi-
cation System (AIS) messages that are mandatory for ships.
The third gap is the sanction gap. Even if an authority has competence and detects
non-compliance, there may be no penalty or only a small penalty. Usually sanctions for
breaking the SECA rules are fines; however, port state control can also detain a vessel if
it is not seaworthy (CompMon 2018). According to OECD (2016, 42), penalties for
non-compliance have typically been smaller than the cost savings of using a non-
compliant fuel. In the USA, there is effective enforcement of sulphur regulation with
high penalties (EPA 2015), but in the EU, there is no harmonization among Member
States on the matter (EMSA 2018). The Directive (EU) 2016/802 does state that
“penalties … shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive” and that the fines should
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“at least deprive those responsible of the economic benefits derived from the infringe-
ment” (European Parliament and Council 2016.)
In conclusion, due to the legal, detection and sanction gaps, both the risk of getting
caught and the economic consequences of getting caught can be small at least in some
places, and these factors vary significantly between the coastal countries of the Baltic
Sea SECA. Simultaneously, economic incentives to use non-compliant fuel are large.
3.3 Explaining SECA compliance from the social pressure and moral obligation
perspectives
Shipping companies may consider that complying with environmental regulations is
inevitable, e.g. due to regular checks. Keeping up a good performance before the eyes of
the control authorities may be highly relevant for day-to-day legitimacy. Pragmatic
legitimacy may be achieved through facing regular control procedures without any
problems. As already discussed above, compliance with SECA regulations is verified by
port-state-control. Simultaneously, many other issues regarding compliance with safety
and environmental regulations are checked. Due to these regular checks and the
reputational risk and related market consequences (e.g. fear of losing freight contracts
and/or clients, increased insurance costs) caused by non-compliance in port-state-con-
trol, shipmasters and vessel crew rather want to comply than take the risk of being non-
compliant (Black 2008; Bloor et al. 2013). The perceived risk of detection may be more
important than the punishment (Burby and Paterson 1993; Gray and Scholtz 1991).
Pragmatic legitimacy may also require the shipping companies to follow rules due to
social pressure from their peers. According to Bloor et al. (2013), free-riding is
considered objectionable in the shipping industry and there is strong plea for “level
playing field” for everyone. The industry has established the Trident Alliance specif-
ically for the purpose of sulphur regulation enforcement (Trident Alliance 2019). Social
pressure and, e.g. public “naming and shaming” campaigns determine also to what
extent non-compliant companies risk their reputation if non-compliance is detected. In
a strong culture of compliance, shipping companies may assume that their market
competitors are compliant.
If the shipowners have internalized the SECA rules, they accept the reasons and
goals of the regulators and their justifications why SECA regulations are needed. They
also consider that restricting the amount of emissions is morally right and contributes to
important environmental and societal benefits. They may gain moral legitimacy
through compliance (Mobus 2005).
Table 1 summarizes the determinants of regulatory compliance
3.4 Interviews with shipping companies
The literature reviewed together with the most recent results of Mellqvist et al.
(Mellqvist et al. 2017a, b, c) shows that the compliance rate of the Baltic Sea SECA
rules is good. As described above, factors beyond rational calculation potentially
motivate compliance. We interviewed shipping companies from the Baltic Sea Region
in April 2018 about their motivations to comply with the SECA regulations. We
chose 110 companies from Finland (30), Estonia (44) and Denmark (36) and
posed five questions to them. Target companies were selected to cover different
What explains SECA compliance: rational calculation or moral... 69
shipping segments and also to show differences between companies originating
from different countries. Danish shipping companies have more international
operations, and Estonia has a short history as a market economy. Finland needs
maritime traffic to serve its own trade more that other Baltic countries due to its
“island”-like position. Because of moral bias towards oneself and one’s own
company, we specifically asked about whether the shipping companies believe
other shipping companies (the competitors of the respondent) to comply with the
rules and why. We believe this question reveals the state of shared moral
principles and justifications. The following questions were asked:
– Do you comply with the current Baltic Sea SECA rules? Why?
– What do you believe is the compliance rate of the Baltic Sea SECA rules?
– Why do other companies comply with the current Baltic Sea SECA rules? +Why not?
– Are you preparing for the 2020 global sulphur rules? Why?
– Do you believe other companies will comply with the 2020 global sulphur rules?
Why / why not?
We interviewed the CEOs of the shipping companies. The CEOs are responsible for
management and leadership of all shipping companies’ activities, so they should
represent companies’ ideas. Interviews were conducted over phone during 6 March–
20 May 2018. Altogether, 29 answers were received and thus the general response rate
was 27%. This chapter analyzes the responses of the 26 companies who saw them-
selves as the regulation targets.1 Most companies are able to comply with the rules.
Only one company based on Estonia said they were unable to comply with the SECA
regulations, stating that this is because they have no money.
When we asked the companies about their own motivation to comply with the
SECA rules, most companies said they follow the law simply because it is the
law and law needs to be followed. The high compliance rate is based on strong
normative justifications and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Nielsen and
Parker 2012): following the rules is the “right thing to do”, and non-compliance
is not an option if a company wants to continue in the shipping business.
Obeying the law and maritime regulations thus has a taken-for-granted status
1 The SECA rules are irrelevant to some companies contacted because their ships are small or because they
only have sailboats.
Table 1 Determinants of regulatory compliance
Awareness of the rules Ability to comply Compliance
Capability to comply:
availability and affordability of options
Compliance costs: fuels vs. scrubbers Economic motivation to comply:
cost–benefit calculationPenalties for non-compliance:
severity and likelihood
Social pressure, expectations of stakeholders Moral motivation to comply:
internalization of the ruleCompany values: what is right and wrong
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among shipping companies. This normative obligation includes all types of
regulations, and the purpose of the regulation is not questioned.
Almost half of the companies also specifically mentioned they follow the SECA
regulations because they want to take care of the environment. For these companies, taking
care of the environment is a part of their internalized affirmative norms (May 2004). These
companies do not see themselves as following the rules just to get the approval of others:
“Because we are honest people and a stock listed company”
“In order to think about future and the betterment of environment”
“Primarily because of the law but also because we believe in regulations for better
causes”
“Its good that we have these regulations, better for environment, a step in the right
direction. Level playing field or equal competition if everyone complies”
When asked about the reasons for other companies for compliance vs. non-
compliance, responses varied much more. While companies themselves often
state to follow the SECA rules by normative motivations, for others, they more
often refer to the practical and economic reasons. Economic reasons are the
obvious explanation to why some companies would try to escape the rules (see
Tables 2 and 3 below): related cost savings and the lack of severe punishments.
Complying with the rules requires costly investments. We see and describe
ourselves as exhibiting our pro-social and moral character, while we recognize
and carefully watch for the tendencies of cheating and hypocrisy in others:
“others comply because they are afraid to get caught and harm the reputation and
the market they don’t want to be in the first page in the newspapers… so it’s the
reputation issue mainly”
“… port system control where all vessels are monitored where they arrive from all
over the world … and I don’t think it’s worthwhile not to follow these rules”
“More or less they do comply but some try to find loop holes.”
Economic, social and moral motivations are necessarily intertwined in decision-
making on whether to comply with societal norms. Harm to reputation and
failure to meet customer and other stakeholder expectations does have economic
consequences at least in the longer run, since shipping companies are likely to
Table 2 The main justifications motivating SECA compliance
Economic motivations Social motivations Normative motivations
Cost of losing reputation and
thus customers
Harm to reputation, naming
and shaming
Following the regulations is taken for granted
Everyone else follows the
regulations as well
Strong sense of moral duty: “we need to
think of the environment”
Meeting customer
expectations
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lose customers if their reputation is questionable and if they have many viola-
tions in port-state control (Akamangwa 2017). Although the fines for SECA non-
compliance are negligible, shipping companies seem to think that these other
indirect economic consequences are more serious and costly. Thus, fear of
negative economic and social consequences due to non-compliance—not official
punishments as such—seem to motivate most companies to comply with SECA
regulations.
Shipping companies were also asked what they think is the overall compliance rate
with SOx regulation among shipping companies operating in the Baltic Sea. Estima-
tions for compliance rate varied between less than 50% and 100%. Not all companies
dared to guess the compliance rate: it is not easy to be confident about what competitors
are doing.
“Absolutely no idea but 95% or more”
“90 something”.
When asked about the impacts of the 2020 sulphur emission regulation, what matters
most is whether the company in question has operations only inside the present SECA
area or whether it also operates elsewhere. The reasons to comply with the forthcoming
sulphur emission regulation are the same as with present regulations. Most Finnish
companies saw they are not impacted by these rules as most of them mainly operate
within the SECA and therefore already need to comply with much stricter rules. Some
saw the 2020 as levelling the playing field.
Some Danish companies saw the future rules as causing extra cost and causing
uncertainty for their operations, as majority of them operate outside the present SECA.
Many of the Danish shipping companies are still considering their compliance options.
As an immediate consequence, many companies expect fuel prices to rise.
“So far we are waiting and talking about scrubber or MGO, the prices will rise but
we are generally waiting to see how things go”
“If they want to ship, owners should soon take action. I think some of the
companies are like us waiting at the moment to hear about the prices of the
scrubbers, waiting for the first person to buy them and in general just waiting.”
“We as a company are fully aware that something should be done, this is the first
step to help the earth with the problem we foresee. It will cost for sure but
something is to be done.”
When asked about the compliance behaviour of other companies after 2020, inter-
viewees were rather pessimistic. Some shipowners do believe that most of the world will
follow the rules, while others do not have much faith:
Table 3 The main justifications discouraging SECA compliance
Economic motivations Social motivations Normative motivations
Non-compliance saves money Consequences of non-compliance are very small
Small fines of non-compliance
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“Awillingness is there for sure but if they actually do that’s a different thing.”
“Majority will comply but I don’t think everyone will.”
“Some will be tempted not to comply but major and serious companies will
comply for sure.”
Many respondents were in the opinion that compliance with the forthcoming regulations is
likely to vary a great deal, because ensuring compliance is based onmonitoring conducted by
individual flag and coastal states and no global monitoring and/or enforcement mechanisms
exist especially for the high seas. The respondents pointed out that some flag and coastal
states are either reluctant or unable to enforce the regulations, e.g. due to lack of resources:
“I don’t believe [in full compliance], because the same compliance control we
have here is not in place everywhere.”
“Regulations are followed only in the Baltic Sea, elsewhere controlling (of the
rules) is much harder.”
“Mediterranean, Far East and Africa will not follow the rules because the
situation in the countries in these regions is very different (compared to us).”
The responses confirm the results of many earlier studies on the problems of present
maritime governance architecture and regulation of industries with global operations. Since
shipping mainly takes place outside national jurisdictions, it is regulated through a combi-
nation of national authorities, the EU and the InternationalMaritime Organization (IMO). In
addition, shipowners can choose where to register their ships in order to deliberately avoid
national regulations (DeSombre 2006; Bloor et al. 2013; Roe 2013; Valentine et al. 2013;
Lister et al. 2015; Yliskylä-Peuralahti and Gritsenko 2014; Yliskylä-Peuralahti 2017).
Above, we stated that the rational option for shipowners would probably be to
switch between compliance and non-compliance depending on the place. The ship-
owners interviewed do not admit doing this, however. This may be because many of the
companies we interviewed only sail the SECAs. For ships traveling in and out of
SECAs, it is legal and normal to switch fuels and to have separate tanks for different
fuels. There is an incentive to switch to cheaper fuel early when leaving a SECA, late
when entering the SECA and when out of reach of SECA control. In 2020, there will be
a carriage ban for fuels that are non-compliant of the global sulphur rules.
4 Conclusions: what explains SECA compliance
The necessary determinants for regulatory compliance seem to have been reached with the
Baltic Sea SECA: it is an example of an international environmental norm with a fairly
good compliance rate, close to 90% (OECD 2016; CompMon 2018). Regulation targets
are very well aware of the rules, as they have been discussed extensively in IMO, EU and
national level before the implementation of the regulation. The regulation targets have
been active in participating in the regulatory process. The shipping industry has not been
against the SECA regulation as such, but it has demanded fair regulation globally and is
not in favour of regional regulation, such as forming of SECAs, as it distorts competition
(Yliskylä-Peuralahti 2017). Suppliers to the shipping industry have been active in devel-
oping clean technology and alternative fuels and promoting their products for SECA
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compliance with a focus on sustainability and responsibility. Awareness and capability
together create an ability to comply with regulations. In addition to ability, compliance
motivation (willingness to comply with regulation) is a necessary determinant for com-
pliance. The regulation targets seem to have good relationships with authorities and are
able to participate the enforcement process for instance by taking part in the European
Sustainable Shipping Forum (ESSF) and national working groups. It is generally agreed
upon that the societal benefits of the regulation exceed the costs (EMSA 2018), although
there are also critical views (see Antturi et al. 2016).
It seems the SECA regulation is fairly well internalized by regulation targets: they do
not consider the option of non-compliance. Regulation targets comply in order to uphold
their legitimacy (Suchman 1995), have affirmative motives for compliance (May 2004)
and have internalized the goals of the regulation (Winter and May 2001). Such a situation
can only be created if the regulatory goals are acknowledged as worthy by society at large
and by the important stakeholders of the shipping companies. Good air quality in large
Northern European port cities and human health seem to be such a goal. The stricter
environmental regulation can give the Baltic Sea and the North Sea a forerunner position
in clean shipping when the global SOx emission regulations come in force in 2020.
We have interviewed companies from three countries around the Baltic Sea. We
focused our study to why companies comply with the current Baltic Sea SECA rules,
and we also investigated the views of Baltic Sea companies on the global 2020 rules. It
would also be interesting to study the SECA compliance motivations of shipowners from
other countries around the North Sea as well as from the coastal regions of the USA. The
technical options for emission reduction including along with their costs are the same
regardless of where shipping is carried out, but there may be some differences in the actor
factors impacting compliance. In comparison to other sea areas, monitoring compliance in
the Baltic Sea is relatively easy; as the sea area is small, maritime authorities in the port and
coastal states have resources to conduct port-state-control effectively, and there is a strong
“compliance culture” among shipping companies in the region. This is not the case in other
regions in the world, and not even inside Europe. However, even within the Baltic Sea, not
everybody complies. More credible controls and sanctions would enhance the compliance
rate in Europe even further, and harmonization of the enforcement among EU countries
would be important. Now the fuel sampling on ships is based on risk analysis (see
Sampson et al. 2016). The airborne sampling can give good back-up for port state control.
Another option is to have a sniffer in all the ships. With global rules on green house gas
emissions, more devices on ships to sample the exhaust gases is one option for monitoring
the compliance of several environmental regulations.
The forthcoming global sulphur emission regulation is based on the same IMO-based
regulatory framework as the SECA rules. The only difference between SECA and the
forthcoming global rules is the allowed sulphur content of the fuel used in ships. Therefore,
when the global 2020 sulphur emission regulation is in place, shipping companies and
maritime authorities in other coastal regions are likely to face same questions as their Baltic
counterparts regarding how to comply with the (global) rules and how to ensure efficient
compliance monitoring and sanctions for non-compliance. Shipping companies interviewed
were rather pessimistic regarding the compliance of global emission regulations. Pessimism
is mainly due to significant differences in enforcement resources in coastal states outside
Europe, marked differences in companies’ attitudes towards environmental protection and
respect of regulations in general, and technical difficulties in monitoring ships sailing in the
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High Seas.With the global sulphur emission rules, the legal authority at High Seas will need
to be solved. Operators need to know that the international community governs the High
Seas with credible and impartial authority. The carriage ban on non-compliant fuel set by the
IMO enters into force on 1March 2020. This will facilitate the successful enforcement of the
global rules (Trident Alliance).
Parviainen et al. (2018) believe that through multi-stakeholder alliances, it is possible
Media discourse is a part of building the compliance culture: regulators and other stake-
holders express their opinions and state their values in the media. Through their statements,
companies impact each other’s compliance motivations. In March 2018, one representative
of British Petroleum expected about 9% of the industry to be non-compliant as the rule takes
effect in 2020 (Kumar 2018). Such a starting result would be deemed fairly good, and the
goal of greatly improved air quality and human health would be achieved.
For oil companies, the compliance rate and the choice between compliance options
by shipping companies are decisive factors shaping their demand. For keeping oil-
based fuels competitive, they need to be cheaper than other compliance options. A
major shift towards distillate oils and hybrid fuels is happening due to the environ-
mental demands, regulations benefiting modern and flexible refineries (Xu 2018). In
addition to the environmental benefits, the more expensive distillate oil has benefits in
higher thermal value, lowered fuel consumption and less sludge (Notteboom 2011, 67).
Oil companies may in the future bring these benefits more to the fore in their marketing.
In the future, hydrogen energy may challenge oil-based fuels (de Troya).
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